Update: Destructive Malware Targeting Organizations in Ukraine … – US-CERT




An official website of the United States government Here’s how you know
Actions to Take Today:
• Set antivirus and antimalware programs to conduct regular scans.
• Enable strong spam filters to prevent phishing emails from reaching end users.
• Filter network traffic.
• Update software.
• Require multifactor authentication.
(Updated April 28, 2022) This advisory has been updated to include additional Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) for WhisperGate and technical details for HermeticWiper, IsaacWiper, HermeticWizard, and CaddyWiper destructive malware, all of which have been deployed against Ukraine since January 2022. Additional IOCs associated with WhisperGate are in the Appendix, and specific malware analysis reports (MAR) are hyperlinked below.  
(end of update)
Leading up to Russia’s unprovoked attack against Ukraine, threat actors deployed destructive malware against organizations in Ukraine to destroy computer systems and render them inoperable. 
Destructive malware can present a direct threat to an organization’s daily operations, impacting the availability of critical assets and data. Further disruptive cyberattacks against organizations in Ukraine are likely to occur and may unintentionally spill over to organizations in other countries. Organizations should increase vigilance and evaluate their capabilities encompassing planning, preparation, detection, and response for such an event. 
This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) between the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) provides information on WhisperGate and HermeticWiper malware as well as open-source indicators of compromise (IOCs) for organizations to detect and prevent the malware. Additionally, this joint CSA provides recommended guidance and considerations for organizations to address as part of network architecture, security baseline, continuous monitoring, and incident response practices.
Download the Joint Cybersecurity Advisory: Update: Destructive Malware Targeting Organizations in Ukraine (pdf, 559kb).
Click here for STIX.
Threat actors have deployed destructive malware, including both WhisperGate and HermeticWiper, against organizations in Ukraine to destroy computer systems and render them inoperable. Listed below are high-level summaries of campaigns employing the malware. CISA recommends organizations review the resources listed below for more in-depth analysis and see the Mitigation section for best practices on handling destructive malware.   
On January 15, 2022, Microsoft announced the identification of a sophisticated malware operation targeting multiple organizations in Ukraine. The malware, known as WhisperGate, has two stages that corrupts a system’s master boot record, displays a fake ransomware note, and encrypts files based on certain file extensions. Note: although a ransomware message is displayed during the attack, Microsoft highlighted that the targeted data is destroyed, and is not recoverable even if a ransom is paid. See Microsoft’s blog on Destructive malware targeting Ukrainian organizations for more information and see the IOCs in table 1. 
Table 1: IOCs associated with WhisperGate
a196c6b8ffcb97ffb276d04f354696e2391311db3841ae16c8c9f56f36a38e92
dcbbae5a1c61dbbbb7dcd6dc5dd1eb1169f5329958d38b58c3fd9384081c9b78
Microsoft MSTIC
 
(Updated April 28, 2022) See Appendix: Additional IOCs associated with WhisperGate.
On February 23, 2022, cybersecurity researchers disclosed that malware known as HermeticWiper was being used against organizations in Ukraine. According to SentinelLabs, the malware targets Windows devices, manipulating the master boot record and resulting in subsequent boot failure. Note: according to Broadcom Software, “[HermeticWiper] has some similarities to the earlier WhisperGate wiper attacks against Ukraine, where the wiper was disguised as ransomware.” See the following resources for more information and see the IOCs in table 2 below. 
Table 2: IOCs associated with HermeticWiper
SentinelLabs
SentinelLabs
SentinelLabs
SentinelLabs
SentinelLabs
SentinelLabs
As previously noted above, destructive malware can present a direct threat to an organization’s daily operations, impacting the availability of critical assets and data. Organizations should increase vigilance and evaluate their capabilities, encompassing planning, preparation, detection, and response, for such an event. This section is focused on the threat of malware using enterprise-scale distributed propagation methods and provides recommended guidance and considerations for an organization to address as part of their network architecture, security baseline, continuous monitoring, and incident response practices. 
CISA and the FBI urge all organizations to implement the following recommendations to increase their cyber resilience against this threat.
Destructive malware may use popular communication tools to spread, including worms sent through email and instant messages, Trojan horses dropped from websites, and virus-infected files downloaded from peer-to-peer connections. Malware seeks to exploit existing vulnerabilities on systems for quiet and easy access.
The malware has the capability to target a large scope of systems and can execute across multiple systems throughout a network. As a result, it is important for organizations to assess their environment for atypical channels for malware delivery and/or propagation throughout their systems. Systems to assess include:
While not only applicable to malware, threat actors could compromise additional resources to impact the availability of critical data and applications. Common examples include:
Common strategies can be followed to strengthen an organization’s resilience against destructive malware. Targeted assessment and enforcement of best practices should be employed for enterprise components susceptible to destructive malware.
A business impact analysis (BIA) is a key component of contingency planning and preparation. The overall output of a BIA will provide an organization with two key components (as related to critical mission/business operations):
Based upon the identification of an organization’s mission critical assets (and their associated interdependencies), in the event that an organization is impacted by destructive malware, recovery and reconstitution efforts should be considered.
To plan for this scenario, an organization should address the availability and accessibility for the following resources (and should include the scope of these items within incident response exercises and scenarios):
Victims of a destructive malware attacks should immediately focus on containment to reduce the scope of affected systems. Strategies for containment include:
As related to incident response and incident handling, organizations are encouraged to report incidents to the FBI and CISA (see the Contact section below) and to preserve forensic data for use in internal investigation of the incident or for possible law enforcement purposes. See Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity for more information.
All organizations should report incidents and anomalous activity to CISA 24/7 Operations Center at [email protected] or (888) 282-0870 and/or to the FBI via your local FBI field office or the FBI’s 24/7 CyWatch at (855) 292-3937 or [email protected].
Updated April 28, 2022:
The hashes in Table 3 contain malicious binaries, droppers, and macros linked to WhisperGate cyber actors activity. The binaries are predominantly .Net and are obfuscated. Obfuscation varies; some of the binaries contain multiple layers of obfuscation. Analysis identified multiple uses of string reversal, character replacement, base64 encoding, and packing. Additionally, the malicious binaries contain multiple defenses including VM checks, sandbox detection and evasion, and anti-debugging techniques. Finally, the sleep command was used in varying lengths via PowerShell to obfuscate execution on a victim’s network. 
All Microsoft .doc files contain a malicious macro that is base64 encoded. Upon enabling the macro, a PowerShell script runs a sleep command and then downloads a file from an external site. The script connects to the external website via HTTP to download an executable. Upon download, the executable is saved to C:UsersPublicDocuments filepath on the victim host. 
An identified zip file was found to contain the Microsoft Word file macro_t1smud.doc. Once the macro is enabled, a bash script runs a sleep command and the script connects to htxxps://the.earth.li/~sgtatham/putty/latest/w32/putty.exe. This binary is likely the legitimate Putty Secure Shell binary. Upon download the file is saved to C:UsersPublicDocuments file path.
Profile of Malicious Hashes
Table 3: Additional IOCs associated with WhisperGate
Hash
Associated Files
647ebdca2ef6b74b17bb126df19bf0ed88341650
loader2132.exe
24f71409bde9d01e3519236e66f3452236302e46
saint.exe
1e3497ac435936be06ba665a4acd06b850cf56b4
loader.exe
981319f00b654d0142430082f2e636ef69a377d9
Yudjcfoyg.exe
e0dbe49c9398a954095ee68186f391c288b9fcc5
Project_1.exe
0ba64c284dc0e13bc3f7adfee084ed25844da3d2
Hjtiyz.jpg
6b8eab6713abb7c1c51701f12f23cdff2ff3a243
Ltfckzl.jpg
3bbb84206f0c81f7fd57148f913db448a8172e92
Vgdnggv.jpg
7c77b1c72a2228936e4989de2dfab95bfbbbc737
Pfiegomql.jpg
c0cd6f8567df73e9851dbca4f7c4fbfe4813a2e1
Fezpwij.jpg
d6830184a413628db9946faaae8b08099c0593a0
Bqpptgcal.jpg
d083da96134924273a7cbc8b6c51c1e92de4f9e1
loader.jpg
d599f16e60a916f38f201f1a4e6d73cb92822502
Debythht.jpg
9b9374a5e376492184a368fcc6723a7012132eae
Dmhdgocsp.jpg
86bd95db7b514ea0185dba7876fa612fae42b715
Zysyrokzk.jpg
e7917df9feabfedae47d8b905136d52cb5cb7f37
Baeipiyd.jpg
b2d863fc444b99c479859ad7f012b840f896172e
Tbopbh.jpg
d85e1614cf4a1e9ec632580b62b0ecb5f8664352
Lxkdjr.jpg
08f0b0d66d370151fd8a265b1f9be8be61cc1aa9
Twojt.bin
5ac592332a406d5b2dcfc81b131d261da7e791d2
Rvlxi.bin
052825569c880212e1e39898d387ef50238aaf35
Yarfe.bin
4c2a0f44b176ba83347062df1d56919a25445568
Ftvqpq.bin
d51214461fc694a218a01591c72fe89af0353bc1
Pkbsu.bin
1125b2c3c91491aa71e0536bb9a8a1b86ff8f641
Pkcxiu.bin
37f54f121bcae65b4b3dd680694a11c5a5dfc406
loader.bin
4facd9a973505bb00eb1fd9687cbab906742df73
loader.bin
376a2339cbbb94d33f82dea2ea78bb011485e0d9
Qmpnrffn.bin
b6793fc62b27ee3cce24e9e63e3108a777f71904
Vpzhote.bin
1fc463b2f53ba0889c90cc2b7866afae45a511de
Yymmdbfrb.bin
ff71f9defc2dd27b488d961ce0fbc6ece56b2962
Zlhmmwutx.bin
13ca079770f6f9bdddfea5f9d829889dc1fbc4ed
Xhlnfjeqy.bin
c99c982d1515ade3da81268e79f5e5f7d550aabd
Gpfsqm.png
d6ffa42548ff12703e38c5db6c9c39c34fe3d82a
Ktlbo.png
bd5116865bcf066758f817ba9385cc7d001ecad9
Vgdnggv.png
034c0d73b21cf17c25c086d19a6ef3bb8a06bab7
Rsscffiiu.png
69e4efc8000a473d2b2c0067f317b22664453205
loader.png
424f7a756f72f1da9012859bf86ad7651bafa937
Wmztvc.png
6c64e1f2ba11ecff5e899f880d14da42acf3f699
Ygxdlt.png
fa8a373e837d7be2fce0bfe073a6fdeaefc56ca1
Fewbfaklk.png
0eccc0aa674fd9fc27023c70067e630fd5d21cd6
www.google.png
6e11c3e119499f11b83787cc4bb5f2751bd90219
Nxoaa.com
8a93bfd9e70611547a420971662d113b6b3c6234
Lxkdjr.com
b19d5f0d8696271aff5af616b91a4cdc73981934
www.google.com
b5e3e65cd6b09b17d4819a1379dde7db3e33813b
Cpdfx.jpeg
d92e315f3c290a7e71950480f074af5b59e8bd3d
Mtubbb.jpeg
fb83899dc633c59a8473a3048c9aacce7e1bf8d8
Kzwolw.jpeg
5fbd9bd73040d7a2cac0fc21d2fe29ebe57fb597
Fczdcmep.jpeg
90fa56e79765d27d35706d028d32dc5be7efb623
Jdeiipc.jpeg
cd8ef5a2543a2535416655f861c574c63e9008ea
5415.jpeg
72a45d6bfde93eb92a7b7a1ea284f35e1d24203a
000.jpeg
d2a697fc1b61888c49a48ce094e400b62a71201d
Ofewufeiy.exe
bddb6994656659d098d6040dc895e90877fb1266
load.exe
00d6c66ab2fd1810628d13980cc73275884933b1
loader.exe
12f50a97955497c49f9603ea2531384e430f0df5
loader.exe
27c176bbd3e254d5e46ccb865d29c8c166ba4a9f
Wdlord.bin
88c76d31b046227d82f94db87697b25e482eb398
Ofewufeiy.bin
2e113050a81bbd0774db7e86fad4abd44e5b6ec2
Bdfjvu.bin
db370ee79d9b4bd44e07f425d7b06beffc8bdded
Jdnpanki.bin
88e5bf24bd0f01778217c4fcdb37b76929c2d32b
downloader.bin
f6acdc16c695c3c219116aea3d585efedcafdab5
up74987340.bin
c3181fd7cb463893fc73974acc0016605d90ef6c
Tdivhgry.png
731dab83ef1d02203db64fbefbe59f3791db1e21
Mbowytboz.png
50566fdea2f4b8a3466427f9c6798dabe2587823
Tlmbluje.png
5dbd68dd3bab6f3a06e303d68bb23e37994084eb
loader.png
ac618c4ece55eca2b067bedd2ce963b8ada30b40
antidef.bat
a0074dbb3316eb570c08219609921a33052d7356
antidef.bat
c4f8d6354ef3ee4e437aa7312df0121446d3a71f
antidef.bat
d9c2ce9c53f10cd12844a98270b4559e9fbfde44
antidef.bat
87a36b87bade46d0b0614b104152db7814808b21
antidef.bat
d3ff54b679922ff9296bfb1b4c379d361f44afd9
1631031555.doc
71daf7af9480743f9e20254946521d6b648b0fe8
1631031555.doc
1aa120fe90d053060fb4e741bcde1f41d6d33303
1631031555.doc
aa124ef17e870e6cd291cb371cde52ca4ffc94d2
1631031555.doc
f79829972bc0ace5c498df3a840acf7d41c56056
1631031555.doc
efa60e42ff1f5c5b57b9fb15a5b04baded2c4c82
1631031555.doc
c96fc59fbe8495dbb50e5ba73b53496614ef8a8a
1631031555.doc
09650cb7a5ed0f43cf67985d03182ca608591a7c
1631031555.doc
c9600ba9e63500b2fe345ff190042ef11d4ce88e
1631031555.doc
ba6f3e474174bcb97c365b4d6365c71ca294aa16
1631031555.doc
f71f0289d99aa1334e7e74b68320cbabbd37fbc1
1631031555.doc
50df153f513b3be09e474b23553b3610625fbb41
1631031555.doc
9496494756ab4276cf4e4aeb4988e781f0db031a
1631031555.doc
4de3118370c2720d60df566684b8b3b7ebf6dfa2
1631031555.doc
d2d475d2df5b0ec1e97ea45e499f55e45d2aac17
1631031555.doc
cdf858add61db5c44503f78cda67915ddb0f77d6
1631031555.doc
39e7abe29f4a574d80b438233e4d2099b99000bb
1631031555.doc
4212472d84ab9f36402bcc12193b9c63901a21d2
1631031555.doc
2277461ac707766f5bb694235b7edfd78af26ff1
1631031555.doc
d57100a6d734be30a8a92734175a67983c7b0c32
1631031555.doc
ba9a811915c3134bfde4414b051a8e6d7949080c
1631031555.doc
1d543a67ea0fcbc5cdc3d698af0d285356d2001b
1631031555.doc
965e4bae8d753efc695c3b1705f43ea7333a1688
1631031555.doc
594fad1593de55df36f294a32330f7b6f487a3e8
1631031555.doc
ac672a07c62d48c0a7f98554038913770efaef11
1631031555.doc
fa62e7df0cc1ece81ba2228cc22be01214cab2ab
1631031555.doc
fdc6bf0a4154d79115ddfac02134580ac4685222
1631031555.doc
e5828387cd6f596932d6caebfd76de1df5ba9ee2
1631031555.doc
f5c769d2a27877e56cc0c540490b26c7c0ff25dd
1631031555.doc
b589574d1ca3438929b8051329552d8e62a7a128
1631031555.doc
1f731bef9777cd4531de39b98a881d83506bb5d9
1631031555.doc
e68dc7a106dab7186fc3ff3f7c70ab280b89d17d
1631031555.doc
572acb2baea77c5ba8e9fe668fd81a817e695d73
1631031555.doc
27a6e76209de03e55136dd72533f3c81d3e715e4
1631031555.doc
1ae21693ce6060059a1284a1e3166f735c339687
1631031555.doc
9e96114159d458597ed2fdc8603a97c9cd2c1e90
1631031555.doc
ca00849b308d48daaea7d86e0d7c7af580a2e856
1631031555.doc
305d215c36d2a7fd9913007059a93e140503870d
1631031555.doc
d503b4818a36f7eae9fbee0d8468b811bca87e83
1631031555.doc
512510a1a5c20ecbcc96781366edaaac58ae4608
1631031555.doc
e53c3b7726cb36b3e898d48ad0f25dbd032e8a8b
1631031555.doc
2ecbb11218f3a24a6c1f33ea7027ab714fad2c3f
1631031555.doc
93cecf50d645ff633ef57e014c49a3ae967140c6
1631031555.doc
10bc94cdefb8ed8d305d087ca868b8fe963c69d4
1631031555.doc
c4740eec9528e1a205326c8a7b7e8d44c8a5b6b1
1631031555.doc
312b8526b3e961887104e80f6447f5bb33ed06df
1631031555.doc
88750f0e1f488656ef0aeb3c40a5785d6c72eb3f
1631031555.doc
c5e57aa3e027f1ae4d3216a5b652b11a63314534
1631031555.doc
d6594fda649e3e4f15ea35e8ed29ac5c8c14760a
1631031555.doc
f831bb0148a8f9d34f914d9560be062c821a7d83
1631031555.doc
b48cbc3ba518c9db5840169e1e21b3ca66cd8177
1631031555.doc
3bb75935fc79205dffccb6102a19f0b96300ab70
1631031555.doc
9d0d4de1d09624de659ce39f449ce5a17f1bef50
1631031555.doc
5ab518686fcd3879dd8c02d74b97caa333ea51ab
1631031555.doc
8fbc7565af01b4a53c72fede3678f4aeba40c5f4
1631031555.doc
8998c076c21930b8fb223882fd9d82899544a902
1621031555.doc
988f07a4094a4a93b76a165ea9f7e251bbbf340f
1621031555.doc
95cf3c261178388c850a777ffe981bbeb287afcb
1621031555.doc
e52cea59499060b8d0e84a7594a687448599f386
1621031555.doc
cdcccb2a011cd22f49d7a96ffb06df3fe334f960
1621031555.doc
5ec9d35b41ee59d109370b257603aa804ecb7c15
1621031555.doc
42a28a4fa6bdb674be63001cd5efff6f7c1b11fc
1621031555.doc
4fabb94902244f60fd2359c61c1c79434095a2ba
1621031555.doc
fbc4d60042c69bf2b5fec701201b24ceb22a43fe
1621031555.doc
5096ca0de8b6ca27dcdcf5790a2cb99566f03e04
1622031555.doc
f7cf30c68989c4a3852397f59fda5d8d1f67f396
1622031555.doc
c4ebbfcb3dc47a1260a0af9b3eb9b125f48d22cc
1622031555.doc
59b03cfb7f2d672f66eb6d027244cb1d9f39f30a
16.09.2021.pdf.js
4ac3c035909101ebddcb78573723d4d48b293a6e
loader_exe_64_97975_1.exe
f990e9c85cd196f9380930e951fbc2085fdf76b7
api_signed_3.exe
e8623063485c61d7411fab8f72cfdbab08f29131
api_crypted_2.exe
e0770b79e372f2cab86ae2ec33b5160708059eee
payload.exe
2ee451947da9efdee0e9f39c9623f388297db6b4
test2.exe
21312d.exe
c681f91c80673deff9f6efa61060f597fc0c1cd0
payload.exe
d8d875f31c4d7c40cfd6483d6b250943d4f5e437
api177_crypted.exe
f24c3237a1612888c8b5526e557a963f3b73e984
api177_signed.exe
76152dc6243ae29d8315f24f6e9449d620f672cd
Fearsomely.exe
d08d894023b16b8374466e6e9ede97f56f7cd4c7
firstgoon.exe
f7ab3996edf81551fdd867fdd28a616491445c38
test4.exe
31ef83a2032cdcc2412991a8fbfe75ed1eed11e8
documents.exe
d08d894023b16b8374466e6e9ede97f56f7cd4c7
firstgoon1.exe
8b9e47457a645d41b98ba07249e8cc3406831cb5
7.exe
f9b6fff55fef34fc49432c8338eb3e9c0c44286e
Matrix_MAX.exe
b91ede2fa35ea3d4031fb51c32bc8211ab5f1e75
crypted.exe
d665b0cfd313d8a72586b0515b92496dd7dc4bb0
crypted_2.exe
4a434c738e402242ecca92182312f04ce336ff86
work.exe
3e50a761cd4bbd9eeaf8f6b9629f9ce871d6f2dd
SLP.exe
6c216522d2a1211399fb08567fcdec1d341340e3
Downloader.exe
6d11b5e4fce9c580b06298ca3dd4a6134fe4b520
Xhlnfjeqy.exe
3ac2d185c28548d43ea47b8fa3795b4308a4c39d
Jdnpanki.exe
e0770b79e372f2cab86ae2ec33b5160708059eee
payload.vbs
payload_2.vbs
98ab3ae46358a66c480810d1e4f24ef730e4dc7e
1.rar
This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.
Please share your thoughts.
We recently updated our anonymous product survey; we’d welcome your feedback.
phone icon(888)282-0870
email iconSend us email
lock iconDownload PGP/GPG keys
feedback iconSubmit website feedback
Receive security alerts, tips, and other updates.
CISA is part of the Department of Homeland Security

source


CyberTelugu

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Back to top

Adblock Detected

Please consider supporting us by disabling your ad blocker

Refresh Page